Implications of Modi Victory Predicted by the Council of Indian Muslims

From: Council of Indian Muslims (UK) [mailto:news@coimuk.org] Sent: Monday, April 14, 2014 7:24 PM To: Council of Indian Muslims (UK) Subject: The implications of a Modi victory will be far reaching and irreversible for India than many seem to realize



Waiting for the Apocalyps 


Avery nihilistic and self-destructive thinking appears to be taking over some Muslims. “So what if Modi comes to power? What is it that secular parties have not done to us?”  They ask his logic and unthoughtful equation of BJP with other political parties would have made some sense if the issue was merely about anti-Muslim riots. But the problem is far more serious.  As far as anti-Muslim riots are concerned, perhaps, as the experience shows, under Modi there will be complete peace and calm but this will be the tranquillity of a graveyard. 

Although the Sanghis are masters of lies and deceptions, the “Gujarat Experiment” has sharpened these skills even more. They use sectarian violence as a means to polarise the atmosphere, misguide innocent voters and grab power.  Once in power anti-Muslim pogroms are replaced by oppression of minorities and Hinduization of schools and offices. Gujarat and other states where they have ruled in the past are glaring examples of it.

It’s worth looking at some examples of how the saffron brigade has implemented Hindutva agenda in the past. In this regard it should be remembered that not only during the tenure of BJP Chief Minister Kalyan Singh was the Babri Mosque demolished in 1992 but in his second tenure in 1997 he also imposed  the singing of Sarasvati Vandana and Vande Mataram in government schools and colleges, a practice no successive government has been able to reverse.

The practice of Muslims being forced to participate in Hindu worship has not remained confined to schools but has reached in government offices too. This is how a friend working at a very senior position has described the situation, “I have observed a practicing and beard sporting Muslim head of a department take part in inaugural ceremonies being started with Hindu worship. He had to light the lamp, break a coconut, accept prasad and put vermillion on his head etc. The RSS and its Hindutva agenda has been gradually entering schools and offices. Muslim leadership is nowhere. It pains when we look towards the future of our younger generations and their future way of life.”


In 2000 BJP’s UP Chief Minister Ram Prakash Gupta, created an atmosphere of terror and harassment. In addition to taking several extreme pro-Hindutva measures he also tried to pass UP Religious Places Bill  that would have made it impossible for Muslims even to repair or make even minor improvements in a mosque or madrassa without the permission of a commissioner.


In 2001 a Report of Group of Ministers, headed by L.K. Advani, on “Reforming the National Security System ” branded Indian Muslims as a security risk. Following the commands of the Central Government, UP Government went a step further and issued a circular  that said, “Every SHO will prepare a register of Muslims and Sikh families living in his perspective area; details of outsiders coming in his area should also be maintained and they be strictly watched…”


In 2003, when BJP was not even in absolute majority, Atal Bihari Vajpaee-led NDA Government honoured  RSS leader V.D. Sarvarkar in parliament and unveiled his portrait in the Central Hall leaving all secular politicians making feeble protests.

No matter how much one hates Narendra Modi, the fact cannot be denied that he is an extremely clever and shrewd politician. He knows when to play a Hindu card and when to champion the cause of economic development.


When it suited him he cashed on the highly deplorable Godhra tragedy, allowed the parading of charred bodies of kasevaks, let his foot soldiers go around and commit worst atrocities with impunity against ordinary citizens who had no role in the burning of Sabarmati Express. But when he needed and wished to control the situation he did it in a remarkable manner even after as provocative an incident as the attack on Aksherdham temple and in the highly charged atmosphere of post Gujarat massacre 2002.


For as long as he was content with the Chief Ministry of Gujarat he continued to spew venom against Muslims, polarised the atmosphere, rode on the poisonous tide and succeeded in being elected as CM three times in a row. But as soon as he was shown the dream of Prime Ministership, a desire impossible to achieve without Muslims’ support, he turned secular.


In 2002 he justified the anti-Muslim pogroms in his state calling it a “reaction to an action”, taunted Muslims saying “ham 2 hamare 25” and boasted his achievements saying , “We brought Narmada waters during shravan (monsoons), but the Congress would have wanted it in Ramzan.”  However, in 2014 in his election rally in Bihar he lamented the economic and educational backwardness of Muslims who, he pitied, were as poor as not to be able to go to perform Hajj.


It should be remembered that the first ever drama of ideological change and being Muslim friendly was performed by the Sangh Parivar in the post emergency elections of 1977 after which L.K. Advani came to occupy a post as important as the Broadcasting Minister. During this period the RSS managed to penetrate government offices, occupied high offices, Hinduized the set up and brainwashed the common man.

The impact of this brain washing was witnessed during Advani’s so called Ram Temple Movement that was participated in by senior retired police officers and bureaucrats.


The joining of retired army officers in this fascist party, their involvement in anti-Muslim terrorism  and the training provided by them to the so-called Kar Sevaks to demolish the Babri Mosque, as has been exposed by the Cobrapost .com is before everyone to see. The joining in BJP by Mumbai’s former Police Commissioner Satiya Pal Singh  and former Army Chief VK Singh  is a sad commentary on the poison BJP and the Sangh Parivar has spread.


Those who have forgotten Advani’s terror or were too young at that time to remember it, this his is how the celebrated British writer William Darlimple had reported from Delhi, “In the German winter of 1929 it was the political failure of the Weimar Republic and the onset of hyperinflation that ushered in the rise of National Socialists Party. In the winter of 1990 a similar course of events has brought to prominence the Hindu fundamentalist Bharatiya Janata Party (or BJP). In the 1984 election the BJP took only two seats. Last year they took 88. When Chandra Shekhar’s rag-tag government falls (and few expect it to survive much beyond the spring of 1991, most commentators predict that the BJP will sweep the whole northern India… The man behind BJP’s rise to power is L.K. Advani… BJP’s revolution has been preceded by a mysterious distribution of tens of thousands of inflammatory cassettes…  The cassettes openly encouraged anti-Muslim violence: ‘Our Motherland cries out for succour, cries out for martyrs who will cut the [Muslims] enemies of the nation to pieces’ says one I found in a market near my house. ‘We cannot suffer anymore the descendants of Babur [founder of the Mogul dynasty]. If this means a blood bath, then let there for once be a blood bath… In Delhi drawing rooms fascism has become fashionable; educated people will tell you without embarrassment that it is about time the Muslims are disciplined—that they are dirty and fanatical, that they breed like rabbits. While chattering classes chatter, others take direct action. As I write, Old Delhi is in flames as Hindus and Muslims battle it out in the streets”. (The Spectator, 8 December 1990).

Like Modi refusing to apologize for Gujarat pogroms, Advani never expressed any remorse for his crimes and for leading frenzied mobs that torn down the Babri Mosque.


However, in the following years he adopted the posture of a moderate politician. In order to prove his secular and moderate credentials he praised Mohammad Ali Jinnah and called him a secularist, a deadly sin—also committed by his friend Jaswant Singh and for which both have been made to pay—because that did not go well with the RSS. Advani’s effort to please Pakistan as well as Indian Muslims by praising Jinnah is also a proof of how the Sangh Parivar looks at Indian Muslims.


The worldwide condemnation of his 2002 pogroms, denial of visas by US, Germany and UK and criticism and denunciation by non-Hindutva masses of the country has taught Modi and his brigade that violence cannot help them for long.


If the unthinkable really happens and Modi comes to power he will surely wear the mask of secularism and become even more moderate than he is pretending to be at the moment and will try to act to be holier than the holiest. However, behind this moderation he will continue the Hindutva agenda with far more vigour than his predecessors.


His Gujarat experience and Congress’s soft Hindutva , being practiced since 1947, has taught him important lessons. Hard Hindutva sugar-quoted by soft-Hindutva will be far more dangerous than BJP’s Gujarat or Muzaffarnagar experiments the impact of which will be felt throughout in the future.

 From: Council of Indian Muslims (UK) [mailto:news@coimuk.org] Sent: Monday, December 02, 2013 7:46 PM To: Council of Indian Muslims (UK) Subject: Assaults on Muslims in trains and buses continue unabated in western UP






Please also watch



From: Council of Indian Muslims (UK) [mailto:news@coimuk.org] Sent: Friday, February 28, 2014 9:17 PM To: Council of Indian Muslims (UK) Subject: London meeting hears witnesses of women's human rights violation presided by BJP's prime ministerial candidate Narendra Modi       

PRESS RELEASE: For Immediate Release 

28th February 2014 

Continuing violations of women's human rights abuses by Narendra Modi exposed by witnesses speaking at London meeting 

Speakers at a meeting organised by the London School of Economics' Gender Institute next Monday will indict Narendra Modi, Prime Ministerial candidate in the forthcoming Indian election for his role in orchestrating gender violence and serious violations of women's human rights in India. The meeting will draw attention to the fact that these continuing human rights violations are linked to Narendra Modi's election campaign and will urge the British government to cease engagement with Modi and the right-wing Hindu political forces he represents. 



Speaking in London for the first time, Nishrin Jafri Hussain, whose father, the MP Ahsan Jafri, was brutally murdered  in the 2002 anti-Muslim violence in Gujarat state and whose family is waging an ongoing legal battle to bring Narendra Modi, who presided over the violence as Chief Minister of Gujarat, to justice , will talk about the experiences of women rape survivors in Gujarat (2), and her own childhood experiences living in a refugee camp after earlier riots orchestrated by the Hindu right in 1969. 

Dr Angana Chatterji an anthropologist and leading human rights specialist, who convened a people's tribunal in Odisha in 2005, calling attention to the impending violence against Christians will speak about her path-breaking research into violence against religious minorities in Odisha and the role of the state in the violence and its aftermath. 

Meena Kandasamy  a Dalit feminist activist and political columnist and author whose first novel , The Gypsy Goddess, revisits  the 1968 Kilvenmani massacre where feudal landlords in Tanjore killed 44 Dalit peasants striking for higher wages will speak about what happens when women challenge right-wing Hindu political forces and the caste hierarchies which they support. She will also examine the Hindu Right's notion of the ideal woman which fuels a culture of victim-blaming and moral policing. 

The meeting  organised jointly by the LSE Gender Institute, South Asia Solidarity Group and the Freedom Without Fear Platform will examine   

  • The experiences of those seeking justice for the victims and survivors of organized violence against minority communities in Gujarat and Odisha  and  the role of the state in the violence and its aftermath in each case? 
  • How  the Hindu right mobilizes gendered discourses of religion and caste? 
  • How the  practices of ‘moral policing’ and fabrications such as ‘love jihad’ have impacted on gender relations, and how are they being resisted? 
  • What is the relationship of the British and U.S. governments, transnational corporations and diaspora communities with the Hindu right in India? 
  • And how a possible victory for Narendra Modi at a national level mean would impact on gendered violence

Dr Kalpana Wilson of the LSE Gender Institute who will chair the event, explained: 

'What we are currently seeing in India is the rise of fascism in which horrific and organised sexual violence against women from minority communities is an integral part. Narendra Modi described Gujarat as the "laboratory of a Hindu state" and already in the run-up to elections we have seen the orchestrated violence in Muzaffarnagar, U.P. in which women have been targeted for mass rapes  (3). Inseparable from this is the rise of so-called "moral policing" of young people and invoking the "protection" of Hindu women as a justification for violence against religious minorities and Dalits. This event will draw attention to these disturbing developments for women and also question the British government and British companies' relationship with Modi and the Hindu right in India.' 




For further details or to arrange interviews with any of the speakers call South Asia Solidarity Group 07846873341  sasg@southasiasolidarity.org.

  Massacre of Indian Muslims in Muzaffarnagar

The Milli Gazette Online, Published Online: Sep 16, 2013


The communal violence against the Muslim community in Muzaffarnagar district and

adjoining areas since 27 August has taken its heavy toll. About 50 persons have been killed,

thousands of homes have been looted and burnt and some 50,000 people have fled their

villages and are now sheltered in madrasas, schools and other places while some gone to their

relatives in other villages.

According to our reports, bodies are lying in villages which are still inaccessible due to

curfew or fear or the marauding mobs. These people had to flee their villages as mobs came

to attack them. Dozens of villages have since been reduced to ashes. Besides various town

areas, at least two dozen villages were attacked by mobs incited by RSS-BJP-VHP goons

while the police, local and state administration stood by silently.

A relief camp at Budhana


Though violence has abated belatedly due to some government action and curfew, attacks and

burning of villages continues until now and so continues the streams of the uprooted who are

moving to safer places and taking refuge in madrasas, schools and in Muslim-majority

This is the first time in UP that rural areas too have been targeted and Gujarat-like riots have

been attempted here to uproot and marginalise Muslims. Because of continuing curfew, a

clear assessment is still not possible but according to our information, there are 10,000

uprooted persons in Jola village, 4000 in Shahpur village, 250 are housed in the Madrasa

Gulzar Muhammadi in the same village, 1,000 in Mohalla Qasaban, 125 in Jamia Arabia

Imdadul Uloom in Harsoli, 10,000 in Budhana and 600 in the RJ Public school in the same

village, 4500 in Loee village, 1500 in Kheda, 2500 in Mandwara, 2000 in Asaara. There are

also groups in Kerana, Kandhla, Kalyanpur and Dabedi but their numbers could not be

  1. These people had to flee their homes with their women and children at least

warning and they could hardly bring anything with them. They are in urgent need of all kind

of help. Their quick return to their villages is necessary because past experience of Gujarat

and Assam shows that if uprooted persons do not return quickly to their homes and villages,

their properties and agricultural lands are occupied by others who do not allow them to

JUH's Mahmood Madni visits Jhola village graves where eight person were buried

including a women with her baby still clinging to her chest. Both were burnt alive by a



These people require urgent help to survive in their temporary camps and also to rebuild their

homes which in most cases have been looted and burnt down. Your urgent and generous help

will go a long way to help them survive and rebuild their lives. Our all-out help is necessary

also to frustrate the communal forces’ plans which if allowed to succeed will be repeated 


Women of uprooted families

List of Martyrs

 The following is an incomplete list of people killed by the rioters since 27 August 2013,

according information collected by Jamiat Ulama-e Hind (Mahmood Madni) upto noon, 11

September 2013. More bodies are being discovered in fields and from burnt houses etc.:


  1. Salman alias Saddam s/o Muhammad Umar - Village Toera, PS Kakroli
  2. Nazar Mohammad s/o Moosa - village Kheri Firozabad, PS Kakroli
  3. Latafat Ali s/o Mustafa - village Kheri Firozabad, PS Kakroli
  4. Maroof s/o Ayyoob - Gram Macheda Sadat, PS Meerapur
  5. Muhammad Shareef s/o Shameem Ahmad - village Soltabhavna - PS Meerut
  6. Rauzuddin s/o Basheer Ahmad - village Mukundpur, PS Muzaffarnagar
  7. Haji Sirajuddin s/o Eidoo - vill Jahra, PS Mansoorpur
  8. Waheed d/o Sirajuddin - village Lasadh, PS Phugana
  9. Nasruddin s/o Kareemuddin - village Lasadh, PS Phugana

10 Azeemuddin s/o Gainda - village Lasadh, PS Phugana

  1. Asghari d/o Hakeemu - village Lasadh, PS Phugana
  2. Haleemun d/o Azeemuddin - village Lasadh, PS Phugana
  3. Wakeela d/o Yameen - village Lasadh, PS Phugana
  4. Umar Deen s/o Siddeeq - village Lasadh, PS Phugana
  5. Hakeemuddin s/o Banda Hasan - village Lasadh, PS Phugana
  6. Choti d/o Banda Hasan - village Lasadh, PS Phugana
  7. Showee d/o Bannoo - village Lasadh, PS Phugana
  8. Kalloo s/o Balla - village Lasadh, PS Phugana
  9. Hajee Naseebuddin s/o Naklee Dhabee - village Lasadh, PS Phugana
  10. Sukkhan s/o Manoo - village Lasadh, PS Phugana

Hakam Deen s/o Balul - village Lasadh, PS Phugana

  1. Karmuddin s/o Kamaluddin - village Lasadh, PS Phugana
  2. [Unnamed] - village Basi Palree Shahpur PS Afsana

 24. Shahnawaz s/o Saleem Pahlawan - village Kawal PS Jansath

  1. Nawab s/o Akhtar - village Navlagardhi PS Mansoorpur
  2. Saeed s/o Akhtar - village Navlagardhi PS Mansoorpur
  3. Qari Umar Daraz village Bad Adda, PS Babri
  4. Ameeruddin s/o Maqsood Qureshi - village Mansoorpur
  5. Shamshad s/o Habeeb Ahmad - village Katba PS Bhora
  6. Muhammad Faiz s/o Muhammad Sulaiman - village Katba PS Bhora
  7. Khatoon d/o Kadamuddin - village Katba PS Bhora
  8. Muhammad Ibrees s/o Kadamuddin - vill Katba PS Bhora
  9. Muhammad Turabuddin s/o Sameera - village Katba PS Bhora
  10. Abdul Qayyoom s/o Abdul Azeez - village Katba PS Bhora
  11. Abdul Wahid s/o Barfuddin - village Katba PS Bhora
  12. Abdul Hameed s/o Makboola - village Samalkha PS Shamli
  13. Aas Muhammad - village Phogana PS Phogana
  14. Islamuddin - village Phogana PS Phogana

39.Mehar Deen s/o Rasheed - village Lakh PS Bhora

  1. Shahzad s/o Meher Deen - village Lakh PS Bhora
  2. Abul Hasan Saifi s/o Ismail - village Lakh PS Bhora
  3. Waheed Lalgar - village Lakh PS Bhora
  4. Tahir Hasan s/o Wahid - village Lakh PS Bhora
  5. Sister-in-law of Tahir Hasan - village Lakh PS Bhora
  6. Daughter of Tahir Hasan's brother (baby) - village Lakh PS Bhora
  7. Qasim s/o Jeevan - village Lakh PS Bhora
  8. Aas Muhammad s/o Iqbal - village Lakh PS Bhora
  9. Maulana Jan Muhammad – Shamli



What enemy says?

This rhetoric carried by 

Pk Secular lobby.


M J Akbar is openly an enemy mouth piece , but ironically these voices r jumping in our own country from that

Salim mansur khalid   
Sent from my iPhone

Begin forwarded message:

From: Tanweer Alam <tanweer1981@gmail.com> Date: August 10, 2012 1:35:19 PM GMT+05:00 To: undisclosed-recipients:; Subject: [The Moderates] The Great Wall of Silence. M J Akbar Reply-To: the-moderates@googlegroups.com

Byword The Great Wall of Silence M.J. Akbar
What is the difference between Indians and Pakistanis? The answer is uncomplicated: there is no difference. We are the same people, with similar personality strengths, and parallel collective weaknesses. Why then have the two nations moved along such dramatically different arcs in the six decades of their existence?
India and Pakistan are not separated by a mere boundary. They are defined by radically opposed ideas. India believes in a secular state where all faiths are equal; Pakistan in the notion that a state can be founded on the basis of religion.
The two-nation theory, which was the basis of Pakistan, did not separate all Muslims of the subcontinent from Hindus; nearly as many Muslims live in India at this moment, without any hindrance to the exercise of their faith, as live in Pakistan. Pakistan was created on an assumption, which had no basis in either the political or social history of Indian Muslims, that they could not live as equals in  a united, Hindu-majority India. It was a concept that flourished in the wasteland of an inferiority complex.
Indian Muslims who rejected this view, like Maulana Azad and most of the learned Deoband ulema, argued that Islam was a brotherhood, not a nationhood; they pointed out that faith belonged to God, and nations to men. They offered empirical evidence: if faith was sufficient glue, why would there be so many Arab countries? Muslims who fought for Indian unity were swamped by  the high passion of a separation dream that acquired, in the imagination of its advocates, the attributes of an earthly paradise. It took three decades for that cold judge, time, to deliver its first verdict. The two-nation theory collapsed in 1971,  when a majority of Pakistanis broke away to form Bangladesh, an ethnic entity.
Conventional wisdom in the 1950s, particularly of the kind which presumed that “natives” were insufficiently evolved for the higher reaches of political thought, was certain that India’s idealistic one-nation-theory was the bubble that would implode, and Pakistan would stabilize and prosper. Although its polity collapsed within ten years of freedom, Pakistan seemed to offer, initially, a more positive social and economic environment. But as its raison d’être began to unravel in the mid-Sixties, Pakistan’s leaders learnt the wrong lesson from experience. Instead of moving away from theocracy, they increasingly clung to it as the abiding  rationale for survival.
Ironically, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the suave and brilliant barrister who had turned a whisper of the 1930s into the storm of the 1940s, and created Pakistan on the slogan that Islam would be in danger from Hindus once the British left, was the first Pakistani to recognize the perils of the idea he had incubated. In his private thoughts and at least in one major public speech, his first before the Pakistan Constituent Assembly in the second week of March 1947, Jinnah envisaged Pakistan as a secular state with a Muslim majority. He never deigned to acknowledge Gandhi, of course, but it would have been a mirror image of India: Gandhi wanted a united, secular state with a Hindu majority. There was a critical difference, however.
Jinnah’s state was exclusive; Gandhi’s India was inclusive. The point of departure came in the mid-1930s: Gandhi and Congress fought the British for the freedom of India; Jinnah and Muslim League fought the Congress for the freedom of Pakistan. The British acted as brokers, and they did not leave without taking their brokerage.
The idea of India as a pluralist democracy was enshrined very quickly into the document that is the spine of Indian nationalism: India’s Constitution. The debate over whether Pakistan should be an “Islamic state” began to simmer and cartwheel as it came to the difficult part: what precisely did an Islamic state mean? The Justice Munir Commission, set up in the 1950s after Lahore riots against the Ahmadiya sect, offered some wise advice: an Islamic state was a mirage; in any case, it was no business of the state to define who a Muslim was. But wisdom has rarely deflected ideologues from their relentless march towards the extreme. The father of Pakistan, Jinnah, was soon ambushed and overtaken by the godfather of Pakistan, Maulana Maudoodi, creator of the Jamaat e Islami, who did little for  the Pakistan movement, but once it had been founded turned it into fertile ground for his dialectics as well as his foot soldiers. The Jamaat is a tailpiece in electoral battles since the voter does not trust the mullah with governance, but its influence on the ideology of the state is on consistent ascent.
Maudoodi’s extremism, and the inability of Islamabad to do anything about his heirs like terrorist Hafiz Saeed, has not only undermined Indo-Pak relations but also infected the social rubric of Pakistan. Textbooks, which once merely asserted Muslim superiority over Hindus and other non-Muslims, now demonize them in the most malicious language. Family and minority law are caught in a corrosive downward spiral that has little prospect of reversal; and many tribal areas have simply slipped into barbarism.  Pakistan has turned into what I have called a “jelly state” in *Tinderbox: The Past and Future of Pakistan*: jelly quivers constantly, and unlike butter will never melt away. Since it has an underlay of a terrorist sub-structure and an overlay of nuclear weapons, it has become a toxic jelly state. India is a prime victim.
The idea of India, conversely, has saved India from its own calamities.  The healing power of democracy has eased the trauma of both the north-west and the north-east; the secessionist movement built around fear that Sikhism was under threat in secular India lost ground quickly after a brief and violent upsurge. India emerged from the flames of 1980s reborn and resuscitated, held together by the promise of modernity: political rights, gender equality, freedom of faith and economic equity. The idea of India has proved stronger than the Indian; the idea of Pakistan is weaker than the Pakistani.
The sunder is permanent. Both partitions, Pakistan’s from India, and Bangladesh’s from Pakistan, are irreversible. Pakistan’s answers lie in the man it remembers only in selective photographs, and whose personal values and ideology it chooses to ignore, Jinnah.  There is some evidence to suggest that Jinnah did not fully realize the permanence of the separation; after all, he refused to sell his home in Mumbai, although the Nizam of Hyderabad offered Rs 10 lakhs for it, a princely sum in 1947. Perhaps Jinnah thought that Pakistan would be akin to a princely state of the British Raj, independent, but with open borders. In any case, Jinnah would have been repelled by the fundamentalism that is poisoning the life of Pakistan.
The ‘ifs’ of history are little consolation for the certainty of reality. In 1947, America was seven seas away from India; today an Indian probably feels closer psychologically to America than to Pakistan. India and Pakistan are divided by a great wall of silence, which liberals are anxious to breach, which  ideologues are determined to strengthen, and which people are condemned to suffer.