日本イスラーム研究所 Japan Islamic Research Institute


See my writings on the subject on the following link:

 http://www.dawahislamia.com/sharia-and-taliban.php  

 

 What does it take to bring a change in Pakistan?

 
MY ANSWERS:
1. ENFORCE SHARIAH IN PAKISTAN FOR WHICH PURPOSE IT WAS CREATED AND SEPARATED FROM INDIA.
 
2. LET ALL AMERICAN FORCES LEAVE FROM THE REGION AND DISMANTLE ALL AMERICAN BASES IN ALL MUSLIM COUNTRIES. EVEN A FRIENDLY COUNTRY LIKE JAPAN WANTS AMERICAN FORCES TO DISMANTLE THEIR BASES FROM JAPAN AND IS READY TO PAY EXPENSES TO AMERICA FOR SHIFTING BASES FROM OKINAWA TO NEARBY AMERICAN ISLANDS LIKE HAWAII, GUAM AND OTHERS.
 
 3. PRAY FOR THE SUCCESS OF TALIBAN NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE PAKISTAN GOVERNMENT.
 
4. PRAY FOR THE CHANGE IN OUR MILITARY PERCEPTION THAT THEY CAN ELIMINATE TALIBAN BY MILITATY OPERATIONS. THEIR OVER 5,000 OPERATIONS DURING LAST 11 YEARS HAVE FAILED, SAYS PTI LEADER, IMRAN KHAN. MILITARY OPERATIONS HAVE RESULTED IN THE INCREASE OF THEIR RECRUITS BY TEN TIMES FOR EACH ONE PERSON THEY HAVE KILLED. GUERILLA WARS CANNOT BE ELIMINATED BY BRUTE FORCE. IT IS A LESSON TO BE LEARNT  FROM THE HISTORY OF GUERILLA WARFARE.
 
5. LET OUR INTELLIGENT AGENCIES FIND OUT ABOUT CIA TALIBAN, INDIAN RAW AGENCY HINDU (WITHOUT KHATNA) TALIBAN AND CRIMINAL ELEMENTS IN THE NAME OF GENUINE TALIBAN.
 
 
 
  
 
From: MikeGhouse@aol.com  [mailto:MikeGhouse@aol.com ]
Sent: Wednesday, May 21, 2014 8:42 PM
To:
 
 Subject: What does it take to bring a change in Pakistan?
 
The murderers are roaming in the streets of Pakistan killing and dictating what others can or cannot do. Help me understand what is the government doing about it? What is holding the military to descend in each town and pick up these men?  Is anyone of these men charged with murder, jailed or punished yet? Any accountability?

Do you see hope?  Do you think if these dudes become a menace and threaten Nawaz Shariff, and the Military Chief, they will act? Is that the last hope?
 
Mike 
From: Hussain Khan, Tokyo [mailto:786@mail.towardsquran.com]
Sent: Wednesday, May 21, 2014 10:39 PM
To:
Subject: RE: What does it take to bring a change in Pakistan?
 
 
Imran Khan says that over 5,000 military operations have been done during the last 11 years. These have all failed. Taliban movement has grown stronger. They demand Shariah at least in their own areas. This demand is giving them more recruits as a result of each military operation. If one person is killed, ten more join to take revenge from Police and Military. Use of force is a process to enhance this 11-year old Movement.
 
There was no such movement in Pakistan before American aggression of Afghanistan
CIA Taliban, Indian RAW Taliban and Criminal elements have taken advantage of the situation to worsen the situation much more.
Guerilla movements cannot be eliminated by use of force. Negotiations is the only solution.
 
See my writing on the subject on the following link:
 
 
Regards,
Hussain Khan, M. A. Tokyo
TALIBAN ARE ASKED TO ACCEPT CONSTITUTION,

BUT THE PEOPLE MAKING THIS DEMAND, HAVE THEY THEMSELVES ACCEPTED CONSTITUTION FIRST?

 
 NAWAZ SHARIF AND GEN. RAHIL SHARIF SHALL FIRST ACCEPT PAKISTAN CONSTITUTION

 AND ENFORCE ISLAM (SHARIA) IN PAKISTAN AS REQUIRED BY THE CONSTITUTION (Prof. Ibrahim)

 

Taliban point of view videos below:

One may not agree with all that they plead,but one should know how they are;

DENYING SOME BASELESS CHARGES AGINST THEM AND ACCEPTING OTHERS AND DEFENDING THEM ON THE BASIS OF FATWAS FROM SOME RENOWNED INDO-PAK ULAMA OF DEOBAND SCHOOL OF THOUGHT.

 

 

Terrorism will automatically come to a halt, if Sharia is implemented in Pakistan

 

See my related articles on the following links:

ARE TALIBAN REALLY BARBARIANS?

by Hussain Khan, Tokyo. Posted By: Hussain_Khan_Tokyo

On: 7/May/2009 Views:1693

 

http://www.ourquran.net/AllaboutTaliban.htm

 

You are in Hussain Khan, Tokyo's Forum - Let us Make ...

 

 

 "IF 180 MILLION MUSLIMS OF PAKISTAN WANT SHARIAH, THEY ARE NOT WRONG."  (Peshawar Jirga)

"Those who are breaking our constitution are sitting in Islamabad, not in tribal areas.

Persons with Beard and Amama are not terrorists.

Tribal people have never burned Pakistan flag. " (Peshawar Jirga)

 

"WE ARE FIGHTING FOR THE SUPREMACY OF SHARIAH IN PAKISTAN" (Taliban)

 

It was tribal Jihadists who had taken over our present Kashmir area soon after the Partition, while the British Commander-in-Chief of Pakistan Army openly refused to obey the orders of Quaid-e-Azam to attack Kashmir.

 

TALIBAN BLAME ARMY STILL TORTURING INNOCENT TRIBAL PEOPLE OPENLY

DESPITE THEIR GIFT OF PEACE FOR THE LAST 54 DAYS THROUGH THEIR CEASEFIRE AND NOT ALLOWING THEIR CHILDERN TO GO TO SCHOOLS, ALL OF WHICH ARE STILL OCCUPIED BY ARMY FOR LAST SEVERAL YEARS.

 

 

Quaid-e-Azam was proud of Tribal Areas' loyalty and sacrifices for the defense of Pakistan. He declared there is no need of Army on the Western border. Presence of Tribal people is a good guarantee for the defense of the Western border. But the present rulers and generals have turned them into terrorists. They are called terrorists, as they are demanding Sharia in Pakistan. If the Sharia is implemented in Pakistan, Taliban will have no cause to fight for.

 

 But Islamic Nazriyati Council submitted 700 Recommendations to Islamize Pakistan and no government cared even to legislate a single recommendation for Islamization of Pakistan.

Where is the Shariah for which Pakistan was gifted to us by Allah despite 67 years of its existence. Taliban movement will automatically come to a halt if our rulers become serious to enforce Shariah.
It was tribal Jihadists who had taken over our present Kashmir area soon after the Partition, while the British Commander-in chief openly refused to obey the orders of Quaid-e-Azam to attach Kashmir.

TALIBAN BLAME ARMY STILL TORTURING INNOCENT TRIBAL PEOPLE OPELY

DESPITE THEIR GIFT OF PEACE FOR THE LAST 54 DAYS THROUGH THEIR CEASEFIRE

WE ARE FIGHTING FOR THE SUPREMACY OF SHARIA IN PAKISTAN

 

Invisible Armies: An Epic History of Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient Times to the Present. By Max Boot. Liveright; 750 pages; $35. To be published in Britain in February by W.W. Norton; £25. Buy from Amazon.com, Amazon.co.uk

LIKE the poor, guerrilla armies have, it seems, always been with us. From the nomadic rebels who brought down the Roman empire to the internet-savvy, plane-exploding jihadists who triggered America’s ill-conceived “global war on terror”, irregular forces are a constant factor in the history of warfare. And fighting them has become tougher than ever.

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    Plenty of literature gives advice on how to beat such maddening foes. Max Boot, a neoconservative American military historian, has done something different. “Invisible Armies” is a narrative history of guerrilla warfare and terrorism (its less effective cousin), ranging from what he describes as its origins, in bringing down the Akkadian empire in Mesopotamia in the 22nd century BC, to the present day. The author moves quite quickly over the first 4,000 years or so and only really gets going in the 18th century, with its revolutionary wars of independence.

    Among the many “liberal” insurgencies he considers are the American revolution; the struggle against Napoleon in the Iberian peninsula; Greece’s war for independence against the Ottomans; the wars of unification in Italy and various uprisings against colonial powers, such as the slave revolt against the French that led to the foundation of the Republic of Haiti. In the 20th century Mr Boot examines the impact of irregular forces in the two world wars (among them those led by the eccentric English officers T.E. Lawrence and Orde Wingate); the contribution to insurgent theory of Mao Zedong’s seminal work “On Guerrilla Warfare”, gleaned from his experiences in the Chinese civil war; the very different French and British responses to rebellions against their fading empires; the “radical chic” revolutionaries of the 1960s and the rise of radical Islamism.

    If this sounds a bit like a list, it is because of the way the book is organised. Mr Boot picks a theme, for example, “The End of Empire”, and then hoovers up into that section all the conflicts that can be made to fit that description. Each one gets a few pages of lively narrative and a brief analysis of why one side prevailed over the other. The formula works rather well. Even when the author is rattling through fairly familiar territory, such as the failures of the French against the Vietminh, he usually finds something fresh or pithy to say.

    Take, for example, Vo Nguyen Giap, the brilliant Communist general who succeeded in expelling first the French and then the Americans from Vietnam. Giap closely followed the teachings of Mao in planning a three-stage struggle—first “localised guerrilla war”, then “war of movement” and finally “general uprising”—which he waged with a three-tier force of village militias, full-time guerrillas and a regular army. But where Mao was always cautious to avoid confrontations with more powerful forces, Giap’s tendency to “roll the dice on premature offensives” in 1951, 1968 and again in 1972 could have proved fatal each time had it not been for the psychological and political frailties of the other side. In guerrilla warfare, what matters most is the ability to shape the story, not the facts on the ground. This is how guerrillas are able to win wars even as they lose battles.

    Because insurgencies pit the weak against the strong, most still end up failing. Between 1775 and 1945 “only” about a quarter achieved most or all of their aims. But since 1945 that number has risen to 40%, according to Mr Boot. Part of the reason for the improving success rate is the rising importance of public opinion. Since 1945 the spread of democracy, education, mass media and the concept of international law have all conspired to sap the will of states engaged in protracted counter-insurgencies. In the battle over the narrative, insurgents have many more weapons at their disposal than before.

    Mr Boot does not conclude that counter-insurgency in the 21st century is a losing game. But to prevail requires an understanding of the game’s rules. He is a powerful advocate for the so-called “population-centric” approach pioneered by the British during the 12-year post-war Malayan Emergency, which lasted until 1960, and rediscovered by American generals such as David Petraeus and Stanley McChrystal in Iraq and Afghanistan only after things there had gone disastrously wrong.

    The first principle is to abandon conventional military tactics. “Clear and hold” beats “search and destroy”. To defeat an insurgency you must provide enough security for ordinary people to live their lives. The second is that legitimacy is vital for both sides: corrupt or excessively violent governments will always struggle, but so too will guerrillas who terrorise their own people. The third is staying power. Firepower is no substitute for patience and boots on the ground. The people you need on your side must believe that you are in it for the long haul. The fourth is that most counter-insurgency campaigns abroad are lost at home. Liberal democracies have short attention spans, low tolerance for casualties and other calls on their cash. Unless voters believe that an intervention is necessary for their own security they will quickly withdraw support for it.

    All of which explains why things are not going well in Afghanistan. The population-centric approach—and the troop surge needed to realise it—came late in the day and with a foolishly rigid deadline. The Afghan government has some popular legitimacy, but not enough in the places where the insurgency is resilient. Nor has it been possible for American forces to deny the Taliban their sanctuary in Pakistan: insurgencies with outside support are much harder to beat. Voters in America and Europe are not prepared to spend any more blood or money on what most presume is a lost cause. Few think that what happens in Afghanistan will affect their own safety.

    Counter-insurgency may be out of fashion again, but it remains necessary to know how to do it. Mr Boot offers a timely reminder to politicians and generals of the hard-earned lessons of history.

    From the print edition