What ISIS and the 'caliphate' mean for Pakistan(A DAWN Article)Updated Jul 03, 2014 05:33pm
(As for as I remember Dr.
Israr Ahmad, (R'td.) General Hamid Gul and Oriya Mabool Jan
have probably all quoted a Hadith from our Prophet (PBUH),
available in some YouTube videos, which means that an Islamic Movement
will rise from the old area of KHURASAN sometime before the end of this
world. Hussain Khan, Tokyo)
Among many factors, the Pakistani state's protracted apathy and inaction on the issue of security has provided non-state actors the spaces to grow and expand their influence. They used these spaces not only to propagate their ideologies and narratives but also to establish a 'state within the state' in Pakistan's tribal areas. Even as counteraction is now underway, the sudden rise of ISIS has threatened to make matters worse for us. The militants are jubilant over the success of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS), which has established a 'caliphate', or 'Islamic state' in parts of Syria and Iraq. This is not the first time militants have captured some territory and established their so-called Islamic writ. Afghanistan, Pakistani tribal areas, Northern Mali and Somalia have experienced similar ventures by militants in the past, though on varying levels. Rise of ISIS ≠ Fall of al QaedaMany experts see the decline of al Qaeda in the rise of ISIS, while analysing the recent developments happening in Iraq and Syria. That is a mistake. A realistic review of militants’ strategies suggests that they first challenge the very foundation of the state by providing alternative socio-cultural and political narratives and then march onto its physical territory.
In some cases, militants develop alliances with nationalist groups. That's what happened in Northern Mali, where the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) had developed coordination with Islamist groups. But when they captured a territory, Islamist groups started imposing Shariah. The alliance was weakened due to ensuing infightings and eventually broke up after a military offensive was launched by the French forces. A dangerous inspirationApart from group dynamics, inspiration plays an important role in militants’ efforts to replicate one success in other parts of the world. The rise and success of ISIS could play a very dangerous, inspirational role in Pakistan, where more than 200 religious organisations are operating on the national and regional level. These organisations pursue multiple agendas such as transformation of society according to their ideologies, the enforcement of Shariah law, establishment of Khilafah (caliphate) system, fulfilment of their sectarian objectives and achievement of Pakistan’s strategic and ideological objectives through militancy. Such organisations could be influenced by the success of ISIS in various ways. A few would limit themselves to providing just moral support, but others might actively provide donations and financial assistance on ISIS' call. Common purpose: Establish the state of KhurasanStill others — mainly religious extremist and militant organisations — could find inspiration in ISIS' strategies and tactics. This is possible since even groups operating in two different regions can find common ground in the Takfiri ideologies they believe in, and in the organisational links they share with each other. The map released by ISIS shows countries for expansion marked in black across North Africa, into mainland Spain, across the Middle East and into Muslim countries of Central and South Asian region. It depicts exactly the states, which are or once remained under Muslim control. According to this notion, the territory which has come under Muslim rule even once becomes a permanent part of Islamic caliphate. These territories, if later invaded by non-Muslims, will be considered as unjustly occupied territories and it will be obligatory for a Muslim to struggle to regain them.
(As
for as I remember Dr. Israr Ahmad, (R'td.) General Hamid Gul and
Oriya Mabool Jan have probably all quoted a Hadith from our
Prophet (PBUH), available in some YouTube videos, which means that an
Islamic Movement will rise from the old area of KHURASAN sometime before
the end of this world. Hussain Khan, Tokyo)
They
consider Khurasan as the base camp of international jihad, from where they
will expand the Islamic state boundaries into other non-Muslim lands.
Mullah Fazlullah of Swat was inspired by the notion and considered himself
the founder of the Khurasan movement.
Many
other groups and commanders in Pakistan and Afghanistan subscribe to the
same idea, but only a few groups have dedicated themselves to the cause of
establishment of the Islamic state of Khurasan.
The
current TTP leadership — mainly Fazlullah and his deputy Qayum Haqqani,
and Khalid Khurasani group in Mohmand and Bajaur agencies of Fata — are
leading this movement, not only on the militant, but on the ideological
front as well.
The
concentration of al Qaeda and TTP hardliner groups in Kunar and Nuristan
are of the same mind; they intend to use the territory as a base camp for
the establishment of the state of Khurasan. Though they are not strong
enough to trigger a massive militant campaign like the one going on in
Iraq, they will remain a critical security irritant and keep inspiring
radical minds in the region.
Though the North Waziristan military offensive is an attempt to
damage militants’ operational baseline, at the same time it has forced the
militants to assemble in Khost, Nuristan and Kunar regions, which are all
places that seem more conducive for beginning a militant struggle toward
the eventual establishment of their fantasised Islamic state.
|
"Even Al Qaeda believes in Dawa instead of use of
force to win popular support of
jihadist"
VoiceInshallah and OjaláThe lessons of counterinsurgency and nation-building in Colombia can also apply to the Arab world.(These lessons can be applied to Pakistan as well. In Columbia, Injustice was ameliorated through nation-building development efforts. In our country, in addition to economic injustice, insurgents are suffering from social injustice as well. Our problems will not be solved by Economic Development alone. We need to ameliorate social injustice as well in addition to fulfilling the aspirations of Insurgents through the enforcement of Islamic Shariah as Taliban so vehemently demand. In any case, use of force and military operations are not the ways to eliminate insurgency. Hussain Khan, Tokyo)
![]() A 50-year ideological struggle, hundreds of thousands
killed, millions displaced, mass graves, murder, rape, torture, a virulent
insurgency threatening the overthrow of the entire social order, a rebel
enclave carved out of the heart of a big nation. It sounds a lot like the
Middle East today, but the grim tale of the tape also applies to the
beautiful Andean nation of Colombia over the past half-century.
Today, however, there is enormous progress in Colombia.
And it's worth pausing, if not to celebrate these accomplishments quite
yet, then at least to consider the lessons we might apply as we grapple
with seemingly intractable problems across the Arab world.
First, the good news: Colombia has made unprecedented
strides over the past decade. The strength of the major insurgency group,
the FARC, has been halved between 2002 and
2010, from 16,000 fighters down to 8,000. Between 2002 and
2012, the murder rate dropped from 70 deaths
per 100,000 people to 31 per 100,000. Kidnappings have dropped by more
than 90 percent since 2002. And there are other successes to crow over:
There are ongoing peace talks for a lasting settlement between the
government and the FARC; the country has re-elected President Juan Manuel
Santos on a platform of conflict resolution; trade and the GDP are up;
Medellín, the nation's second-largest city, is lauded as the "most innovative city in the world"; and
Colombia is popping up on tourist "top 10" lists
everywhere. The country even made the final round at the World Cup.
Obviously, there are big challenges ahead -- concluding
a negotiated settlement with the FARC; stemming the production and export
of cocaine; reducing corruption; and enforcing human rights -- but
Colombia is clearly not the basket case it was a decade ago, as was
heartbreakingly recounted in a Canadian diplomat's memoir, The Saddest Country.
Clearly, something has changed over the past decade.
Could what has worked in Colombia be applicable in the turbulent Middle
East, or for that matter in other conflict-ridden areas of the world,
including parts of Africa and Asia?
Here are some key takeaways that provide lessons for
places elsewhere around the globe:
Outside assistance, especially from the United
States, can help. While Colombia's success is
overwhelmingly attributable to the vigor and determination of the
Colombian people, the international community has been helpful. For
example, the $7 billion U.S.-Colombian program "Plan Colombia"
provided a relatively modest but important level of financial aid,
hundreds of military advisors, military assistance, human rights training,
counternarcotics assistance, and advice on the justice system and rule of
law. European partners, via the work of the European Commission, also
provided over €600 million worth
of assistance.
Interagency cooperation is key.
There are no purely military solutions to pulling a nation or region out of the death spiral of violent extremism. We cannot kill our way to success. Private-public partnerships are vital.
So often the youth of a region take to the streets and fall under the
sway of violent messages because there are very few real alternatives. The
creation of jobs provides hope, especially in a conflict region. The
private sector must be encouraged to take risks through incentives and
subsidies, both domestically and through the international community.
The U.S.-Colombia Free Trade
Agreement, which went into effect on May 15, 2012,
does this by lowering tariffs and duties between the two nations, thus
increasing profit margins on both sides. Many major companies from both
the United States and Europe (and increasingly Asia) are arriving to
participate in an economy that is rapidly expanding as a result of lower
violence, greater political stability, and the effects of the FTA.
Get the message right. Strategic
communications are critical, and can be encouraged both through technical
assistance to harness social networks and through advice on how to shape
the fundamental narrative. The message was that the people of Colombia had
to take control of the destiny of their country, which is the essential
heart of a successful counterinsurgency campaign. In Colombia, a
grassroots strategic communications campaign was built over several years,
culminating in a series of multimillion-person marches, with the message
of taking their nation back from violence and chaos. Building this message
of pulling together to defeat an insurgency and bringing it to life is
crucial.
Technology matters. Certain key
technologies are very helpful in countering violent extremism, as well as
the related challenges of illicit trafficking and illegal migration.
Access to high-tech surveillance satellites, signals intelligence through
phone and radio intercepts, infrared satellite access to show jungle
camps, significant numbers of air-delivered precision-guided weapons,
advanced night-vision devices, and portable logistic support (generators,
vehicles, light aircraft) all come to mind in the Colombian case. These
enablers may be less glamorous than pure hard power, but they can be
critical.
Take on corruption as a priority. In
Colombia, frustration with inequality and corruption created the spark
that set off larger anti-government movements such as the FARC. To be
legitimate in the eyes of the people, governance has to be evenhanded,
relatively transparent, oriented toward human rights, and free of
corruption. The work done in Colombia by anti-corruption task forces
coached by U.S. interagency teams from the Department of Justice, FBI, and
DEA, for example, had an effect. Over the past few years, the
apprehension, prosecution, and conviction of military members for
reporting "false guerrillas" in order to cover up extrajudicial killings
also showed the public that officials would be held accountable.
Success depends on the people. Even
if the international community does everything above perfectly, will Iraq
right itself? Will Syria suddenly stabilize? No. It will ultimately depend
on the will of the people of the Arab world -- or any other nation or
region -- to wrench their society back from the destructive influence of
violent extremism. But we can certainly help -- with financial, political,
educational, developmental, and limited military support, much as we did
in Colombia -- and we should, despite the intense frustration.
* * *
It is interesting to note that the expressions in both
Arabic and Spanish for "Hopefully it will happen, if God wills it," are
very close linguistically: inshallah and ojalá,
respectively. This is the result of the merger of the two cultures on the
Iberian Peninsula in the days of the Umayyad Caliphate, when the languages
bled into each other and the Arab world was at its peak of global
influence. Perhaps it's time for a new merger, where the good results we
can celebrate in Colombia can provide ideas and approaches for the bitter
struggles of the Arab world.
LUIS ROBAYO/AFP/Getty
Images policy choices.This doesn't mean Argentina will remain in arrears for
long. In recent months it has made several market-friendly moves. It
allowed the peso to devalue by roughly
one-third early this year, working to make exports, and by extension the
larger economy, more competitive. In May, it finally renegotiated its $9.7
billion outstanding Paris Club debt, some 13 years in
the making. It also paid the Spanish-led oil giant Repsol for its
expropriated majority share of YPF, Argentina's
national energy company. And it designed a new inflation index in line with IMF
standards, ending its censure from the multilateral agency.
A resolution to this ongoing battle, however, will
depend on both personal and market incentives aligning. Talk of the
Argentine banking association buying out the plaintiffs continues, which
could satisfy the holdouts, permit interest payments for the rest, and
bring Argentina back from financial exile. The government, too, could step
forward, particularly if its Congress repeals the criminalization of
negotiations, which would give officials legal cover to resolve the debt
crisis.
Until then, the Kirchner government will try to make
political hay of its defiance. In his remarks to the press, Kicillof
defiantly blamed the "vulture funds" for their recalcitrance and promised
to defend "the future of the Argentine
people." This bluster positions him -- when the
debt is resolved -- as both the defender and then savior of the nation,
which incidentally might be a strong platform from which to launch his
2015 presidential bid.
Photo by Maxi Failla/AFP/Getty
Images Why al Qaeda, not
the Islamic State, is still the most dangerous terrorist organization on
Earth.
![]() "Even Al Qaeda believes in Dawa instead of use of
force to win popular support of jihadist"
Al
Qaeda ideologues began to emphasize that the old regimes had kept citizens
from knowing true Islam, and thus argued that it was important to
reintroduce people to the faith relatively slowly rather than by simply
exerting their will through force. Groups associated with al Qaeda in
Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia began to expand their dawa
(proselytism) efforts, which were intended to win popular support for
jihadist ideology. Even some of the most hard-line parts of al Qaeda's
international network have recognized that they need to implement their
version of Islamic law gradually. AQIM emir Abu Musab Abdel Wadoud (aka
Abdelmalek Droukdel), for example, wrote a letter
to his fighters in northern Mali after they captured territory there,
warning that one of their "wrong policies" was "the extreme speed with
which you applied sharia, not taking into consideration the gradual
evolution that should be applied in an environment that is ignorant of
religion." The Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham -- which has now
rebranded itself "the Islamic State" (IS) -- is trying to position itself
as the new leader of the global jihadist movement. After being expelled from al Qaeda's network in February, it released several
blistering critiques of al Qaeda emir Ayman al-Zawahiri's leadership --
then launched a stunning offensive against the Iraqi government, and
subsequently declared that it had re-established the
caliphate.
IS has continued its headline-grabbing exploits even
after its initial explosive territorial gains, expanding its holdings in
both Iraq and Syria. As the Iraqi government pushed to retake Tikrit from
IS and other Sunni insurgents, the jihadist group rallied a
counteroffensive that temporarily captured an airfield at Camp Speicher, a
former U.S. military base that supported the Iraqi government operation.
Other IS advances were accompanied by the group's characteristic
over-the-top brutality, for example its capture of the Shaar gas field in Syria's
Homs province, after which the group killed an estimated 270 people. In a
departure from its previous tendency to target rival rebel groups, IS has
also recently begun taking the fight to Assad: On July 25, its fighters
ambushed and killed over 50 Syrian soldiers
in northern Syria -- several were beheaded, and IS proudly displayed its
grisly trophies on social media.
The success of IS has led to a widespread belief among
Western observers that the group has eclipsed al Qaeda. In
Newsweek, writer Kurt Eichenwald described IS as "the biggest threat" to al
Qaeda, and wrote that al Qaeda "faces a growing risk of irrelevance"
because of it. In Foreign Affairs, Barak Mendelsohn argued that IS's success "could be a
harbinger of a tectonic shift" in which IS "could supplant al Qaeda as the
[jihadist] movement's leader"; others have claimed that the shift has already
occurred.
IS's blood-soaked gains represent a real transnational
challenge. It is currently a more formidable force than al Qaeda in both
Iraq and Syria -- the latter being a theater that will fundamentally shape a new generation of
jihadists. That alone will make the group a force to reckon with for years
to come.
Nevertheless, commentators appear to be overestimating
IS's strengths and underestimating al Qaeda's. It is Zawahiri's
organization, not the Islamic State, that will most likely pose the top
jihadist threat to the United States and other Western countries in three
to five years. Despite its rapid gains, the Islamic State is already
showing its weaknesses -- notably in its failure to attract a deep network
outside Iraq and Syria and its propensity to alienate potential partners
through its brutality and refusal to compromise.
Al Qaeda's network is still intact
IS has tried on three separate
occasions to woo al Qaeda's regional branches to pledge allegiance to its
self-styled caliph, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Its attempts failed every
time.
In November 2013, Baghdadi began to quietly feel out
whether these branches would be willing to switch their oaths of loyalty
to him, according to al Qaeda sharia official Abu Sulayman al-Muhajir. In
May 2014, IS spokesman Abu Muhammad al-Adnani publicly made the call for
defections, asking for all of al Qaeda's branches to
issue "an official statement" about the group and its approach to jihad.
No public affirmations of IS were forthcoming -- and the Caucasus Emirate,
a jihadist group opposed to the Russian government, went even further,
publicly declaring Zawahiri to be its emir for the first time.
IS's June announcement of the caliphate was the most
explicit challenge to al Qaeda yet. Resurrecting the caliphate is a goal
shared by most jihadists -- it is a concept not only about projecting
power, but is also about establishing a legitimate ruling authority.
Sayyid Qutb, one of the intellectual forefathers of jihadist thought,
believed that Islam could not truly be
practiced without a caliphate unifying the Muslim world and implementing
Islamic law. Because this imagined caliphate would usurp the authority of
all other bodies, IS's caliphate announcement was a bold attempt to claim
unilateral authority over the entire Muslim world, including other
jihadist groups. Its official statement announcing the caliphate
made this clear, declaring that "the legality of all emirates, groups,
states, and organizations becomes null by the expansion of the caliphate's
authority."
However, not one of al Qaeda's official branches elected
to join Baghdadi's caliphate. While the Islamic State certainly has
supporters within all of al Qaeda's branches -- particularly among
disgruntled elements or lower-level foot soldiers -- this support hasn't
translated into a shifting of loyalties or widespread personnel
defections.
The branches of al Qaeda's international network
responded to IS's announcement of the caliphate in different ways - but
none of them came close to pledging loyalty to Baghdadi. On July 1, al
Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) released a statement praising the Sunni advances in
Iraq and calling for IS to reconcile with its jihadist rivals in Syria --
a message that echoes that of Zawahiri and al Qaeda's central leadership.
When that announcement was widely misinterpreted as a signal that the
group was on its way to defection, AQIM released a new statement on July 14
declaring that it remained loyal to al Qaeda and that it rejected the
Islamic State's caliphate. In Tunisia, Ansar al-Sharia first publicly
denied rumors that it had joined IS's
enterprise, then reposted on its official Facebook page AQIM's statement
condemning the caliphate announcement.
Though al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), which
is often considered the jihadist group's most dangerous branch, hasn't
directly addressed IS's caliphate announcement, its recent messages have
hardly been subtle. In early July, the jihadist group released a poem from Nasir al-Wuhayshi, who serves as
both AQAP's emir and also al Qaeda's general manager, praising Zawahiri,
whom he described as the "sheikh father" and the "apple of the eyes of
jihadists of this time." Shortly afterward, AQAP released a video from two
of its most prominent ideologues rebuking those who "slander" veteran
jihadists. The video was clearly aimed at IS's officials and supporters,
who have become increasingly hostile toward Zawahiri.
The Islamic State's problems in expanding its network
will likely continue, as the group has already alienated the most
influential jihadist ideologues. For example, two of the most credible
jihadist authorities, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi and Abu Qatada, are both
highly critical of IS and Baghdadi's caliphate. In late May, while still
in a Jordanian prison, Maqdisi released a stinging assessment calling IS a "deviant
organization" -- and then reiterated that criticism in another statement in June, following his
release, in which he wondered aloud if Baghdadi would use the caliphate
declaration as a pretext to kill jihadists who refused to offer their
allegiance.
Abu Qatada, who has been imprisoned in Jordan since
2013, has reinforced Maqdisi's criticisms. A pamphlet containing Abu
Qatada's denunciation of IS has been circulating online, arguing that the caliphate announcement is
"void and meaningless because it was not approved by jihadists in other
parts of the world." Abu Qatada's critique resonates in the jihadist
community, and has been echoed by prominent clerics.
With its network still intact, al
Qaeda maintains a deeper and more capable global organization than
IS. Baghdadi and IS have attracted a large number of followers, but
the A-list jihadist talent remains in al Qaeda's camp. Not only have they
failed to grab the reins of the global jihad, but they are now in the
process of repeating Iraqi jihadists' prior strategic errors, which will
further hamper their ability to become the movement's new leader.
A tale of two strategies
This isn't the first time observers believed an
Iraq-based jihadist group had eclipsed al Qaeda.
From 2005 to 2007, some argued that IS's predecessor, al
Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), and its emir, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, had eclipsed
Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda. Zarqawi, after all, was extraordinarily
popular with young jihadists. He reveled in the brutality he inflicted,
releasing videos of his victims being beheaded, and slaughtering Shiite
Muslims, whom he called "a sect of treachery and betrayal."
And like IS, Zarqawi succeeded in controlling territory in one of the
region's critical countries: An assessment written by Col. Peter Devlin in
August 2006 found that AQI had become the "dominant
organization of in?uence" in Anbar province.
But al Qaeda was not happy with Zarqawi's approach.
Zawahiri, who was then al Qaeda's deputy emir, reprimanded AQI's leader in
a letter urging him not to "be deceived by
the praise of some of the zealous young men and their description of you
as the sheikh of the slaughterers." He warned that these fanatics "do not
express the general view of the admirer and the supporter of the
resistance in Iraq."
Zawahiri was right, and Zarqawi was wrong. Although
Zarqawi captured the imagination of young zealots who romanticized his
violence, AQI not only met defeat but also weakened the broader al Qaeda
organization by diminishing its brand. An academic review of how AQI lost Iraq provides a
lengthy account of the group's failings: It wrongly assumed that other
insurgent groups would accept its primacy, employed brutality that earned
it the enmity of the region's tribal groups, and implemented its extreme
version of Islamic law, thereby alienating local groups. These mistakes
are all strikingly familiar in light of IS's recent conduct.
AQI's rise and fall aren't perfectly analogous to the
case of IS. For starters, the United States invested much blood and
treasure in a "surge" of forces that buttressed local uprisings against
AQI. America is less invested in the fight for Iraq today, and Baghdad is
in disarray. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is widely despised outside of
his corrupt patronage network, which nurtures cronyism at the expense of a
truly representative government -- his failures, coupled with the poor
performance of Iraq's military, make IS's job considerably easier.
While the Islamic State appears to be making the same
mistakes all over again, AQI's high-profile collapse -- and the
revolutions of the Arab Spring -- caused al Qaeda to significantly shift
its approach. Al Qaeda ideologues began to emphasize
that the old regimes had kept citizens from knowing true Islam, and thus
argued that it was important to reintroduce people to the faith relatively
slowly rather than by simply exerting their will through force. Groups
associated with al Qaeda in Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia began to expand
their dawa (proselytism) efforts, which were intended to win
popular support for jihadist ideology. Even some of the most hard-line
parts of al Qaeda's international network have recognized that they need
to implement their version of Islamic law gradually. AQIM emir Abu Musab
Abdel Wadoud (aka Abdelmalek Droukdel), for example, wrote a letter
to his fighters in northern Mali after they captured territory there,
warning that one of their "wrong policies" was "the extreme speed with
which you applied sharia, not taking into consideration the gradual
evolution that should be applied in an environment that is ignorant of
religion."
Al Qaeda's base is back
There's no denying that IS has a number of significant
strengths, especially its military prowess in Iraq and Syria. Its
exploits, however, are sometimes overstated -- or made up out of whole
cloth. For example, after IS overran Mosul, media outlets reported that the group had captured over
$400 million from the city's central bank, making it the richest terrorist
group on the planet. Less noticed was a careful follow-up report in the Financial Times
revealing that, according to Iraqi officials and bankers, there was no
evidence that any bank robbery had occurred at all.
Similarly, the Islamic State is reportedly making $1 million a day from the sale of
crude oil from fields it controls. The reality, however, is more complex:
Though $1 million changes hands from these transactions, the claim that IS
reaps all the benefit is misleading because the group does not control all
the proceeds, which are shared with tribes and other rebel groups.
And while IS has an impressive amount of income, it is also spending a
great deal of money holding the territory that it has come to control. The
group lacks skilled professionals to maintain even basic governance
functions, such as electricity, trash collection, and pre-existing social
services, so it has to spend money to ensure that those functions
continue.
The Islamic State's present might be bright, but its
future looks dim. It has done nothing but make enemies in Syria, and the
coalition of Sunni groups it managed to cobble together in Iraq is quickly
descending into infighting. Further, while IS's brutality may yield some
advantages in the region - namely, increasing Sunni-Shiite sectarian
tensions, which plays to IS's advantage -- its brand, like AQI's before
it, is bound to take a hit internationally.
In contrast, al Qaeda can expect a significant boost in
the near term. Though the group's senior leadership in Pakistan has been
disrupted by drone strikes for several years, the U.S. drone campaign has
already been significantly reduced. And as the United States pulls out
from Afghanistan, al Qaeda will find new safe havens in the country. The
remote provinces of Kunar and Nuristan are home to significant cadres of
al Qaeda fighters, and al Qaeda continues to operate side by side with its
allies in other parts of the country. This provides al Qaeda's senior
leadership, which has in the past proven quite resilient to the loss of
personnel, an opportunity to increase its international reach in the
coming years.
While the Islamic State has antagonized would-be allies,
al Qaeda has long operated in South Asia as part of what former Defense
Secretary Robert Gates has called a jihadist "syndicate." It has
long-standing and close ties to groups such as the Afghan Taliban, the
Haqqani network, Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami, the Islamic Movement of
Uzbekistan, Jaish-e-Mohammed, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and the Pakistani Taliban,
among others. And al Qaeda-aligned factions in South Asia have grown over
the past two months with the public announcements of loyalty to Zawahiri
from Junud al-Fida and Ansar ut-Tawheed, both of which are active in
Afghanistan. The increasing strength of these groups will redound to al
Qaeda's benefit: As Gates put it, "What we see is that the success of any
one of these groups leads to new capabilities and a new reputation for
all."
It's tempting to write off Afghanistan as largely
irrelevant to the dispute between IS and al Qaeda. But just as IS has
gained momentum from its gains in Iraq, al Qaeda and its allies are likely
to do the same in Afghanistan in the coming months. Al Qaeda recently
reaffirmed its loyalty to Mullah Omar, the
Taliban's reclusive emir. This may be an attempt to undermine Baghdadi's
claim to be the caliph by portraying Mullah Omar as the jihadists'
rightful leader, as well as an effort to cement al Qaeda's place in a
Taliban-dominated Afghanistan should Mullah Omar's forces conquer parts of
the country once again.
Furthermore, there is a very real risk that IS's
brutality, even toward its fellow jihadists, will help al Qaeda gain the
upper hand. In Syria, the population and other rebel groups have deemed al
Qaeda's local branch, the Nusra Front, to be a more moderate alternative
to IS. In the short run this hasn't stopped IS from achieving tactical
victories over Nusra -- but over the longer term, the Nusra Front may have
the more viable strategy.
But even if al Qaeda can't best the Islamic State in
Syria, it will likely remain the top jihadist threat globally. As with AQI
during its heyday, the Islamic State is comprised of brilliant tacticians
with no strategic vision -- they are seemingly unable to envision where
the group will be next year, let alone five years down the line. Al
Qaeda's vision, on the other hand, promises to keep counterterrorism
analysts up at night for years to come.
-/AFP/Getty Images |
But there are some occasions where Jihad by sword also becomes necessary. During the Soviet Occupation of Afghanistan, America and CIA also supported Mujahedeen for over 10 years until the Mujahedeen won over. No body raised that slogan which you are raising today that Islam is a religion of Peace and sword should be abandoned absolutely on all occasions. This slogan means that we should, Nauzu Billah, permanently eradicate the concept of Jihad from the holy Quran and Hadith.
Like Afghanistan under Soviet Russia, there was no chance for the Sunni and Kurds groups in Iraq and Syria to bring about any change through peaceful and democratic means.
Muslims or Non-Muslims, throughout history people have always revolted against INJUSTICE. Only those countries or areas were saved from the onslaught of Revolts, where Islamic Shariah was in force. American Revolution or French Revolution or Russian Revolutions of 1917 and of 1989 or Iranian Revolution have all been successful Revolts against the INJUSTICE.
Nobody claims that Maliki and Assad governments of Iraq and Syria were doing full Justice to their Kurd and Sunni population. If these victims of Injustice have risen up to revolt, you are calling them 'Terrorists'. If you want to stop such so-called 'terrorism', hollow sermons of 'ISLAM, A RELIGION OF PEACE' will not work. Enforce Islamic Shariah giving equal rights to all citizens in a Muslim State, Peace will automatically reign. Injustice is the breeding ground of 'Terrorism', which you are afraid of.
Hassan Sahib,
Thanks for your comments on my brief remarks.
Of course, I believe that change should be brought by peaceful and democratic means for bringing true Islam into position of political supremacy.
But there are some occasions where Jihad by sword also becomes necessary. During the Soviet Occupation of Afghanistan, America and CIA also supported Mujahedeen for over 10 years until the Mujahedeen won over. No body raised that slogan which you are raising today that Islam is a religion of Peace and sword should be abandoned absolutely on all occasions. This slogan means that we should, Nauzu Billah, permanently eradicate the concept of Jihad from the holy Quran and Hadith.
Like Afghanistan under Soviet Russia, there was no chance for the Sunni and Kurds groups in Iraq and Syria to bring about any change through peaceful and democratic means.
Muslims or Non-Muslims, throughout history people have always revolted against INJUSTICE. Only those countries or areas were saved from the onslaught of Revolts, where Islamic Shariah was in force. American Revolution or French Revolution or Russian Revolutions of 1917 and of 1989 or Iranian Revolution have all been successful Revolts against the INJUSTICE.
Nobody claims that Maliki and Assad governments of Iraq and Syria were doing full Justice to their Kurd and Sunni population. If these victims of Injustice have risen up to revolt, you are calling them 'Terrorists'. If you want to stop such so-called 'terrorism', hollow sermons of 'ISLAM, A RELIGION OF PEACE' will not work. Enforce Islamic Shariah giving equal rights to all citizens in a Muslim State, Peace will automatically reign. Injustice is the breeding ground of 'Terrorism', which you are afraid of.
Sent: Sunday, July 06, 2014 8:44 AM
To: 786@mail.towardsquran.com; and others
From: Hussain Khan, Tokyo <786@mail.towardsquran.com>
To:
Subject: RE: What ISIS and the 'caliphate' mean for Pakistan
Sent: Sunday, July 06, 2014 3:17 AM
To: Hasan Essa
Cc:
On Jul 5, 2014, at 12:38 PM, Hasan Essa <hasniessa@aol.com> wrote:
What ISIS and the 'caliphate' mean for Pakistan
Also please visit my another website for some new materials: http://www.ourquran.net (Under Construction)








![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Also please visit my another website for some new materials: http://www.ourquran.net (Under Construction)
Archive for the 'Hussain Khan' Category
Hussain Khan
Posted by Editor on 4th April 2010




Posted in Article, Hussain Khan, Japan | Comments Off